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Given the relatively small number of 
academics doing serious analysis of the 
PLAN, the introduction of a new point 
of view is always to be welcomed. In 
this case, however, naval professionals 
interested in Chinese naval development 
would be served better by going directly 
to the sources behind this volume.
DALE C. RIELAGE
Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Con-
flict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991, by 
Xiaoming Zhang. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North 
Carolina Press, 2015. 296 pages. $34.95 (e-book 
$33.99).
This book will be welcomed equally 
by historians, political scientists, and 
international relations specialists. It is 
a worthy addition to existing literature 
and belongs on any bookshelf dedicated 
to understanding modern China and 
Southeast Asia. Xiaoming Zhang, an 
associate professor in the Department 
of Strategy at the Air War College, has 
provided valuable additional informa-
tion and analysis concerning the People’s 
Republic of China’s invasion of Vietnam 
in 1979. The Chinese invasion was 
planned deliberately and analytically, 
then for nearly a month the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) fought fiercely 
against China’s neighbor and former 
ally. At the end of this period, the two 
countries settled into a continuing active 
and deadly border dispute that lasted 
a decade. Taking advantage of recently 
declassified Chinese documents and an 
impressive number of interviews, Dr. 
Zhang has advanced significantly our 
understanding of why the Chinese chose 
to initiate the somewhat Orwellian-
sounding “counterattack in self-defense 
against Vietnam,” how the war was 
conducted, and why the subsequent 
conflict along the Vietnamese-
Chinese border lasted so long.
As the history of the conflict unfolds, 
Deng Xiaoping becomes more and 
more the central figure and key Chinese 
decision maker. By the conclusion of the 
book, Dr. Zhang presents a convincing 
case that the war of 1979 was indeed 
Deng’s war—a war into which he entered 
as much to preserve and promote his 
plans for economic modernization as to 
affect the balance of power in the inter-
national political system, while simulta-
neously aiming to rehabilitate and start 
the process of modernizing the PLA.
The book explains how the recent North 
Vietnamese victory over the Americans 
and the South Vietnamese had a surpris-
ingly deleterious effect on Vietnam’s 
previously amiable and long-term alli-
ance with China. Flushed with victory 
and boasting a hardened and well-
equipped army, the Vietnamese became, 
to Chinese eyes, increasingly arrogant 
and unfriendly. Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia and its deepening friendship 
with the Soviet Union led Deng to see 
China’s position as potentially imperiled, 
threatened by the USSR to the north 
and the Vietnamese to the south. In 
particular, the invasion of Cambodia 
in December 1978 was viewed as proof 
of Hanoi’s ambition to make Vietnam a 
hegemonic power in Southeast Asia, and 
added significantly to Deng’s concerns.
Deng, who already had determined that 
economic and industrial modernization 
was the way ahead for China, arrived 
at an apparently counterintuitive 
conclusion. Significant combat opera-
tions conducted against Vietnam, the 
Soviet Union’s most important regional 
ally, would signal to the United States 
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and other Western powers that China 
was a reliable partner that could be 
counted on to do what was needed� 
In return, the West would be more 
likely to continue to support Chinese 
efforts to modernize, and the perceived 
Soviet threat would be reduced�
However, as Zhang explains, the 
Chinese army had not fought a major 
war in three decades� Its tactics were 
outdated and its logistics support was 
inferior, and no officer below the rank 
of battalion commander was battle 
tested� Furthermore, the PLA did not 
enjoy a positive reputation within 
China’s general population� In contrast, 
the Vietnamese army had decades of 
recent combat experience, large stores 
of modern Soviet and captured U�S� 
military equipment, and the intangible 
benefits that come with victory�
A massive propaganda campaign to 
improve the image of the PLA was 
launched� Significant amounts of 
military stores were moved into the 
Guangzhou and Kunming military 
districts� Army planners prepared for 
a massive offensive designed to seize 
several major northern Vietnamese cit-
ies and wreck two Vietnamese divisions 
in the process� The whole campaign was 
designed to “teach Vietnam a lesson�”
Zhang provides a detailed account of 
the fighting that followed� The Chinese 
executed their plan successfully, albeit 
at a much higher cost than anticipated� 
Zhang debunks common claims by 
Vietnamese that the majority of their 
combatants were local militia fight-
ers� While it is true that several elite 
Vietnamese divisions were engaged in 
Cambodia, far more regular army units 
fought in the north than the Vietnamese 
indicated� The war was almost exclu-
sively a ground war, although both the 
Vietnamese and Chinese air forces car-
ried out many reconnaissance missions�
After nearly thirty days of fairly hard 
fighting, Chinese forces withdrew to the 
border, having achieved their geographic 
objectives and inflicted significant ca-
sualties on enemy forces� The operation 
had been calibrated skillfully to “punish” 
Vietnam, without going so far as to bring 
the Soviets into the fray� Deng then 
directed the army to continue to fight 
along the border until the Vietnamese 
withdrew from Cambodia� It would take 
a decade—and the visible decline of the  
Soviet Union—but in the end 
Vietnamese leaders acquiesced and 
Deng got what he wanted� During this 
period Vietnam’s economy suffered� 
China’s southernmost provinces 
also suffered, but the nation reaped 
the benefits of modernization 
and Western engagement�
Chinese military leaders deliberately 
used the ensuing chronic border conflict 
to “blood” much of their army and 
local militias� The war also provided 
new heroes to place in the public eye� 
However, in one of the more poignant 
portions of the book, Zhang describes 
how China’s Vietnam experience 
affected many of the participants in 
much the same manner as it had their 
earlier U�S� equivalents� Strategically, the 
war also saw the Chinese army embrace 
combined operations and a turn to mod-
ernization as a requirement for victory�
Zhang makes a convincing argument 
that Deng Xiaoping calculatingly 
used the Chinese military instrument 
to achieve strategic, domestic, and 
personal goals� His war was one of 
deliberate choice� Potential Vietnamese 
hegemonic ambitions were thwarted; 
Vietnam would be forced to leave 
Cambodia� China’s ties to the West 
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were strengthened; Soviet influence 
in the region was weakened�
China reaped other benefits, although 
some were perhaps mixed� Vietnam 
would—and still does—view China 
with suspicion� Other countries in 
the region now know that China did, 
and could once again, wage offensive 
war, if seen to be in the interest of the 
state� The Chinese military, once so 
abysmally behind technologically, has 
transformed itself� Combined arms 
operations, performed haltingly at 
best in 1979, are now common�
Zhang frequently and conscientiously  
reminds the reader that, although 
knowledge of the Sino-Vietnamese 
conflict has increased greatly, it is  
important not to embrace any conclu-
sions, even the most apparently 
convincing, as definitive� This is because 
some Chinese and all the Vietnamese 
records have yet to be declassified� The 
warning is appropriate, but should 
not detract from Zhang’s analysis, nor 
from a deep appreciation of his work�
RICHARD J� NORTON
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
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